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Chapter 5
Choosing a Financial Advisor: When
and How to Delegate?
Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell
We examine how and when delegating one’s investment decisions to a
ﬁnancial advisor can enhance consumer well-being, taking into account
the fact that workers need to spend time to manage their own portfolios.
When workers manage their own money, this reduces their opportunity to
undertake on-the-job learning. Therefore, self-management of personal
investments reduces future labor market earnings. We ﬁrst investigate how
introducing an investment delegation option at different points in workers’
careers can change results. Young investors have few investable assets but
they have the longest horizon to beneﬁt from sound ﬁnancial advice. Thus it
is not clear ex ante whether younger investors beneﬁt more from having a
delegation option. We also compare these outcomes with what would obtain
if the worker instead adopted simple rule-based investment portfolios such
as conventional Target Date Funds (TDFs) with age-linked investment glide
paths. We explore welfare gains of a few portfolio rules with ﬁxed asset
allocations. Our goal is to quantify the beneﬁts of having access to person-
alized ﬁnancial advice versus portfolios managed according to simple rules,
at different stages over the life cycle.
Our baseline model reﬂects widely observed portfolio management pat-
terns of individual investors, namely portfolio inertia. A great deal of empirical
research shows that most workers are inactive investors: that is, they tend to
‘set and forget’ their investment portfolios. For instance, Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004) showed that over a twelve-year period, three-quarters of the
retirement account holders they examined never altered their retirement
asset allocations at all; similarly, Agnew et al. (2003) reported that almost
90 percent of retirement account holders never altered their portfolios. Such
inertia also applies to non-retirement accounts, in that a majority of equity
owners exhibited portfolio inertia in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data (Bilias et al. 2010). A prominent explanation for why investors
display such inertia is the fact that ﬁnancial management requires people
to pay substantial amounts of monetary or non-monetary transaction costs.
In this chapter, we build a baseline model of investor inertia based on the
time costs that people need to incur when self-managing their portfolios
(Kim et al. 2016).
A Life Cycle Model of Rational Investor Inertia
At the outset, we outline a baseline model of rational inertia used for
evaluating ﬁnancial advice over the life cycle (Kim et al. 2016).1
Time Cost of Financial Management
We posit individual investors who are not ﬁnancial experts and who must
incur time cost (or mental resources) when managing their ﬁnancial port-
folios. Time costs become particularly important when individuals gain job-
speciﬁc human capital on their jobs via learning by doing (Arrow 1962;
Becker 1964). In such a case, devoting time to investment management
comes at the cost of reducing workers’ future labor earnings.
Inertia vs. Active Management
We consider portfolio inertia as one investment management method. If an
investor chooses portfolio inertia in period t, he keeps his current stock
balance for the next period, and the next period’s stock balance is only
inﬂuenced by the stock market return. By choosing portfolio inertia, he
incurs no time cost for managing his ﬁnancial assets, sparing him the need
to analyze new information to reshufﬂe this portfolio. By electing active
portfolio management, he could determine a new mix of equity and bonds,
but in turn, this requires him to incur time cost. This latter will be deducted
from his available time for working, and he may lose an opportunity to
accumulate more job-speciﬁc skills. We formulate the lifetime discounted
utility for each portfolio management method and allow the investor to
optimally choose the portfolio management method with the higher-value
function.2 Thus, central to the rational inertia model are two competing
costs: an opportunity cost for human capital accumulation, and suboptimal
portfolio allocation for a long time.
Preferences
The consumer has a time-separable power utility function deﬁned over a
composite good consisting of current consumption + and time devoted to
leisure Lt, which is given by U tðCt ;LtÞ ¼ 11γ ðCtLαt Þ1γ. Here α > 0 captures
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the investor’s preference for leisure relative to consumption and the par-
ameter γ measures relative risk aversion.
Labor Earnings
Yearly labor income (Et) is determined by the individual’s job-speciﬁc
human capital level (Ht), wage shock (Yt), and labor supply (lt):
Et ¼ ð1 htÞð1 τtÞltHtYtUt ;
where ht and τt represent housing expenditures and labor income tax,
respectively. Ut is a temporary idiosyncratic shock in the labor market.
After the (exogenous) age-65 retirement age (t = 45), the individual stops
working (lt = 0 ) and receives a lifelong pension beneﬁt equal to a fraction of
his ﬁnal labor earnings.
We have calibrated this model for the US using information on labor
income patterns, mortality, retirement beneﬁts, and capital market param-
eters (see Kim et al. 2016). Our calibrated parameters appear in the Appen-
dix. Consistent with most prior life cycle models (e.g., Cocco et al. 2005), our
baseline model matches well with empirically observed patterns of labor
earnings, consumptions, stock balance, and wealth accumulation/decumu-
lation proﬁles (Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Life cycle proﬁles of key variables from a baseline model
Notes: This ﬁgure shows average life cycle proﬁles of key variables when only active
management or inertia are available, generated from 2,000 independent simulations based
on the baseline speciﬁcation. All dollar amounts are in $1,000s deﬂated to year 2012.
Source: Kim et al. (2016).
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When Does Financial Delegation Make Sense?
We model the main beneﬁt of having the option to delegate one’s invest-
ment decisions to a ﬁnancial advisor as the time saved for accumulating
more job-speciﬁc skills or human capital (Kim et al. 2016). When an indi-
vidual uses an advisor, he must pay a fee for the customized advice. By
contrast, if he self-manages his portfolio, this takes time which reduces his
opportunity to invest in job-related human capital that can enhance his
future earnings. Evidently, the attractiveness of delegating to an advisor
will vary over the life cycle in a complex manner. For example, younger
workers have longer time horizons over which to reap the beneﬁts of
ﬁnancial advice. But they also have little money to manage, so hiring a
ﬁnancial advisor might add little value.
If a worker handles his own portfolio himself (self-management), he incurs
time costs which can cut into both leisure and work time. The individual
seeking to limit such time costs could simply maintain his current portfolio
allocation (inertia). Alternatively, he could engage a ﬁnancial advisor (dele-
gation) to do the job in exchange for a ﬁxed plus a variable management fee.
To evaluate when access to ﬁnancial advice would be most beneﬁcial, we
introduce the delegation option at different points over the life cycle. Prior
to the introduction of the advice, investors are assumed to either do nothing
(i.e., engage in portfolio inertia), or self-manage the account (and thus
incur the time cost), whichever is optimal. After access to the advisor is
introduced, this remains an option for the rest of his life.
We assume that ﬁnancial advisors charge an annual management fee which
is a percentage of total assets under management (AUM), along with a
minimum ﬁxed fee. According to documents ﬁled by Registered Investment
Advisors (RIAs) reporting to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, we
have determined that the average annual percentage fee was 1.41 percent of
AUM in 2014. The baselineminimum ﬁxed fee was $2,100 for an investor with
a minimum balance of $150,000 ($2,100/1.41 percent).
Table 5.1 summarizes how making ﬁnancial advice available at different
ages shapes several key outcome variables, including welfare gains (i.e., the
certainty equivalent amount of consumptions), wealth, labor earnings, con-
sumption, labor supply, and leisure time. Four introduction dates are con-
sidered for the delegation option, namely ages 20, 30, 45, and 60. What we
see is, ﬁrst, that consumers are always better off when given access to a
ﬁnancial advisor (row (a)). Second, these gains decline with the age when
the delegation option is made available. That is, workers can expect a 1.07
percent improvement in lifetime welfare when they have an opportunity to
delegate their ﬁnancial decisions to an advisor from the start of their
working lives, at age 20. By contrast, a ten-year delay in the introduction of
the delegation option cuts the gains by almost half. When the delegation
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option is introduced just prior to retirement, at age 60, the lifetime welfare
gain is tiny, only 0.02 percent.
Third, we ﬁnd that early exposure to ﬁnancial advisors generates substan-
tial additional lifetime wealth (row (b)). If workers have access to investment
delegation from age 20 onward, their average wealth is 20 percent higher
than in the no-delegation case. If the delegation is available ten years later,
wealth accumulation rises by less, just 14 percent. And for even later ages,
the impact on wealth is smaller still. And fourth, delegation also changes
income and consumption patterns, as reported in rows (c) and (d) of
Table 5.1. Delegation allows workers to provide more labor supply by saving
their time (row (e)). Again, we see that making advice accessible early in the
work career enhances outcomes the most. We also highlight the interesting
pattern that emerges when we compare the result from introducing delega-
tion at age 45 versus age 60. When ﬁnancial advice is made available only
from age 60, people enjoy slightly more consumption compared to when it is
introduced at age 45 (2.2 percent vs. 2.1 percent) as well as more income
(1.29 percent vs. 1.25 percent), but less leisure (6.1 percent vs. 6.75 per-
cent). The smaller leisure levels produce less measured life satisfaction (0.02
percent vs. 0.19 percent in welfare terms) compared to the benchmark case.
In sum, our results indicate that it is better for investors to have an early
opportunity to hire ﬁnancial advisors, since access to ﬁnancial management
early in life can produce important improvements in wealth and well-being.
If ﬁnancial advisory services are only introduced when people are in their
60s, welfare increases by only small amount (0.02 percent).
TABLE . Impact of introducing a delegation option at alternative ages: investor
gains in well-being
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age = 20 Age = 30 Age = 45 Age = 60
(a) Welfare gain 1.07 0.51 0.19 0.02
(b) Wealth 20.03 14.42 9.05 7.95
(c) Earnings 5.08 2.95 1.25 1.29
(d) Consumption 6.05 3.86 2.10 2.20
(e) Labor supply 7.53 4.62 2.19 2.14
(f) Leisure 7.28 7.18 6.75 6.10
Notes: This table displays the impact of having access to a ﬁnancial advisor to whom
investment decisions can be delegated, at different points in the life cycle. The model with
investor inertia in Kim et al. (2016) is the benchmark case. The table describes the worker’s
welfare gains and average changes in key variables under the delegation option versus the
benchmark without a delegation option. All numbers are in percentage points (%).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Comparing Customized Financial Advice vs.
Simpliﬁed Investment Portfolios
In our benchmark model of investor inertia (Kim et al. 2016), the beneﬁt of
hiring a ﬁnancial advisor is due to the time saved in ﬁnancial management.
In return, an investor will need to pay fees comprised of a minimum ﬁxed
and a variable fee based on total assets under management. To judge how
sensitive people’s welfare gains are to such costs, we next consider varying
fee levels. This question is timely because we observe an emerging industry
of low-cost ﬁnancial advice providers based on modern portfolio theory and
sophisticated computer programs, sometimes called ‘robo-advisors’. These
represent a relatively new phenomenon in the ﬁnancial advice industry, and
they involve the provision of online automated investment services with
virtually no human contact (Reklaitis 2015). Compared to human advisors,
robo-advisors have a cost advantage since their investment suggestions are
pre-programmed based on clients’ characteristics and conditions (e.g., risk
aversion, background risk, current asset mix). In what follows, we model
robo-advisors as investment advice providers charging a lower minimum
ﬁxed fee (i.e., requiring a lower minimum balance) than do human advi-
sors. In return, they provide recommended asset mixes derived from solving
clients’ dynamic portfolio choice problems.
To evaluate results conservatively, we assume that robo-advisors charge an
annual management fee of 1.41 percent of AUM, just as do the human
advisors, but they levy a lower minimum ﬁxed fee.3 Table 5.2 reports results
for workers having access to robo-advisors from age 20. When there is no
minimum annual fee, we see that the young worker’s lifetime consumption
is higher by 1.3 percentage points, or around 19 percent above the levels
with customized but more expensive human ﬁnancial advisors. As the
minimum annual fee rises, this decreases client welfare gains. In other
TABLE . Welfare consequences of ﬁnancial advice provision for alternative
minimum fees
(1) (2) (3)
No minimum fee Minimum fee = $700 Minimum fee = $1,400
Welfare gain 1.30 1.11 1.08
Notes: This table displays the impact of having access to a ﬁnancial advisor charging alternative
annual minimum ﬁxed fees. In each case, the annual variable fee is assumed to be an annual
1.41% of AUM. The model with investor inertia in Kim et al. (2016) is the benchmark case.
The table describes the worker’s welfare under the delegation option alternative, versus the
benchmark without a delegation option. All numbers are in percentage points (%).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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words, robo-advisors have a substantial advantage when busy investors seek
to delegate ﬁnancial management.
In Table 5.3 we compare investor well-being when ‘plain-vanilla’ invest-
ment portfolios are offered in lieu of customized ﬁnancial advice. The ﬁrst
row (a) assumes that the investor must hold 60 percent of his assets in equity,
while the second (b) assumes the equity fraction is 60 percent prior to
retirement, and 20 percent afterwards. The third row (c) assumes that the
equity share equals 100 minus the investor’s age, while the ﬁnal row
(d) assumes that the glide path has the equity share fall to zero as of age 80.
The latter two examples are akin to the prominent portfolio rule of conventional
Target Date Funds, which have become extremely popular in the market-
place over the last two decades.4 None of these plain-vanilla portfolios takes
account of differences in investors’ background risk or job-speciﬁc earnings
patterns. Thus these rules ignore the fact that investors’ decisions regarding
portfolio allocation and the characteristics of their other sources of invest-
able assets are tightly connected. For example, investors whose labor earn-
ings are quite volatile would prefer investment proﬁles with a lower equity
share to hedge against their labor income risk.
The outcomes reported speak to the question of how plain-vanilla port-
folios akin to those seen in the marketplace affect lifetime well-being, across
TABLE . Impact of introducing plain-vanilla portfolios in lieu of investor
inertia: how the change in investor well-being compares to benchmark, for
alternative management fees and equity glide paths
Investment glide
path
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mgmt fee
= 0.84%
Mgmt fee
= 0.5%
Mgmt fee
= 0.2%
Mgmt fee
= 0%
(a) 60% 0.52 0.63 0.88 1.10
(b) 60%! 20% 0.49 0.59 0.84 1.06
(c) 100-age 0.38 0.56 0.81 0.94
(d) 80-age 0.56 0.69 0.98 1.20
Notes: This table displays the impact of having access to alternative equity paths over the life
cycle, versus the benchmark model with investor inertia as in Kim et al. (2016). Each column
shows results for different management fees for the glide path products. All numbers are in
percentage points (%). The row labeled 60% indicates results for the case where 60% of savings
are always invested in stocks. The row labeled 60%! 20% indicates results for the case
where the investor’s equity fraction is 60% prior to retirement, and then falls to 20% thereafter.
The row labeled 100-age indicates results for the case where the fraction of savings invested in
equity is 100 minus the investor’s age. The row labeled 80-age indicates results for the case
where the glide path varies with age but the minimum percentage invested in equity is zero.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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different management fee levels. Column (1) assumes an annual manage-
ment fee of 0.84 percent of AUM, which is the same as the average fee for
TDFs (Yang and Lutton 2014). Columns (2)–(4) show results for succes-
sively lower AUM fees. Results show that consumers do beneﬁt from these
plain-vanilla portfolios, as compared to the baseline model with no access to
delegation options. Nevertheless, the gains are only 30–43 percent of the
robo-advisor case. In columns (2)–(3), we show how lower fees increase
consumers’ levels of well-being, and the ﬁnal column reports results for a
zero management fee. Generally speaking, plain-vanilla investment
accounts and zero management fees generate similar (though still lower)
welfare gains as compared to robo-advisors. TDFs do not perform better
because the equity investment rules depend only on the clients’ ages, and
they ignore clients’ particular circumstances such as human capital risk,
wealth levels, and the time costs of portfolio management. Overall, Table 5.3
suggests a customized delegation option such as a robo-advisor could be
more desirable than a simple rule-based equity share account standardized
for all.
Additional Considerations
Thus far we have noted that having a delegation option tends to increase
consumer well-being. Nevertheless this can also give rise to a principal–
agent problem, due to information asymmetry and possible conﬂicts of
interest between advisors and investors. For example, ﬁnancial advisors
might attempt to maximize their compensation at the expense of investors’
gain. In this chapter, our model considers ‘ideal’ ﬁnancial advisors without
such agency issues. It might be possible that a sophisticated robo-advisor can
mitigate this problem, but including this issue in a life cycle model calls for
additional research beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Another question is what an optimal default option would be for inactive
investors, taking into account additional decisions including how much
clients should contribute to and withdraw from their retirement accounts.
This consideration can become an important issue in retirement plans, and
automatic default options would appropriately explore optimal contribu-
tion and withdrawal patterns over the life cycle, in addition to the portfolio
management.
We have also assumed here that there are no communications problems
between ﬁnancial advisors and investors. Nevertheless, fee communications
are often shrouded (Anagol and Kim 2012) when investors lack knowledge
or have limited time to evaluate information presented. Understanding how
ﬁnancial advisor disclosures shape investor behaviors is likely to have rich
policy implications for regulating the ﬁnancial advisory industry.
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Conclusions
We have quantitatively analyzed the impact of having a delegation option at
different points over the life cycle. We show that having access to a delega-
tion option in one’s early career can have a substantially positive impact on
the investor’s lifetime welfare. Access to advice at age 60 is less beneﬁcial in
the context of our model. And ﬁnally, although TDFs are widely used, they
appear to deliver lower gains compared to having a ﬁnancial advisor cus-
tomize portfolios to investors’ speciﬁc ﬁnancial and economic circum-
stances. Clearly, however, these conclusions about investment advice and
portfolio management depend on the costs of each, as well as the beneﬁts.
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Appendix
TABLE A. Summary of calibrated parameters for the baseline model
Parameter Baseline value
Working periods 45
Retirement periods 35
Time discounting 0.96
Risk aversion 3
Leisure preference 1.0
Std. dev. of permanent wage shock 0.0710
Std. dev. of human capital shock 0.0434
Std. dev. of transitory wage shock (pre-retirement) 0.1726
(continued)
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Notes
1. This section summarizes a model developed in Kim et al. (2016) to which readers
may refer for a discussion of model parameters.
2. There can be behavioral reasons for why investors are inactive in managing their
portfolios. For example, investors may have emotional hurdles to actively manage
their ﬁnancial asset. Although this line of reasoning can be informative, here we
focus on the rational optimization framework to provide quantitatively more
accurate evaluations of having ﬁnancial advice over the life cycle.
3. In practice, robo-advisors can charge even less; see <https://investorjunkie.com/
42668/true-costs-robo-advisors/>.
4. Not all TDFs implement the same gliding path of equity allocation. Some TDFs
use a glide path targeted towards the retirement year (called a ‘to’ glide path),
and others lower the equity allocation through retirement (called a ‘through’
glide path). The latter group of TDFs have more equity exposure in general (Yang
and Lutton 2014).
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